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lIENRY CA VERO, Respondent, v. FRANKLIN GENERAL 
BENEVOLENT SOCIETY (a Corporation), Appellant.' 
[1] Appea1-QUestiODS of Law and Fact-Oonsideration of Evi-
. denC8.-On appeaJtbe evidence must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to rei:lpOndent . 
. 12] Hospitals-Evidence.-In . an action against a hospital and 
other defendants for the wrongful death of plaintiff's 3-year. 
old child while having his tonsils and adenoids removed, in j' 
which the eomplaint alL e··' that bccause of defendants' negli-
gence "the child was cllused to • • . su1focate and drown in 
its own blood •• .," plaintiff did ~ot fail to prove his cause (If 
action where it appcared from the e-vidence that the jury could 
properly, and must be presumed to, have concluded from tht· 
autopsy report thnt the iUlmediate cause of death was til.! 
inspiration of hemorrhagic mllterial resulting frOID the ne(·t'';· 
sity of giving artificial reSpiration, and that that neeessity t 
was caused in turn by the erratic and excessive admiuistratiulJ \ 
of anesthetic. 
:,(3] Id.-Evidcncc.-lnan action against a hospital and others for 
. the death of pl,yiiiiff's S-year-old cbiJd whileundergoinl! <l 
tonsillectolUY ill the hospital, the evidence supported the 1111-
plied finding of the jury thnt the nurse-anesthetist attendiJlg tIl(' 
operation WIUI the employe or agent of defendant hOllpitnl. 
rather thun of defendant doctors,and that the responsibility 
was at least primarily that of the anesthetist. 
[4] Negligence-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The eonditions for 
the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine are that the 
accident be of a kind that does not happen in the absence of 
some negligence, the agency or instrumentality causing it must 
have been within the exclusive control of the defendant, and 
it must not have been due to any voluntary action on the part 
f)f the plaintiif. 
[5] Rospitals-Instructions.-In an· action for the wrongful death . 
of plnintiff's 3-year-old lIOn while undergoing a tonsillectomy I 
and under the -influence of a gas anesthetic, an instruction on 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was proper where the evidence 
established, in the abs('uce of explanation, that the ebiJd's death 
was due to something which ordinarily docs Dot occur in the 
[2] Bee 13 Oal.Jur. 775. 
[4J See 19 OaLJur. 704; 38 Am.Jur. 989. 
Melt. DJg. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § l243; [2,3] Hos-
pitals, 119; [4] Negligence, 1l.33; [5,6] Hospita1a, 120. 
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absence of ncgligenee, that it was caused by an agency or 
instrumentality within the control of defendant, and that it 
was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the 
part of either plllintifi' or the child. 
(8] Id.-Instruetions.-Where in an aetion for the wrongful death 
of plaintiff's minor son while undergoing a tonsillectomy an 
instruction on the res ipsa loquitur rule is properly given as to . 
all defendants, it is not made erroneous as to defendant hospital 
by the fact that the jury accepted the explanatory evidence caB 
being sufficiently exculpatory in respect to the doctors but DO' 
to the hospital. . '-
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of the 
Oity and County of San Francisco. James G. Oonlan, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
Action for damages for wrongful death. Judgment' f~r 
plaintiff affirmed. 
Hadsell, Sweet, Ingalls & Murman and Sydney P. Yurman '; 
for Appellant. . 
Hartley F. Pea~ Gus L. Baraty, Howard I:IJI~!$.~!!l 
A. Smith and Alan L. Bonriington as Amicus 
behalf of Appellant. 
Hallinan, MacInnis & Zamloch, James Martin Macinnis 
William F. Cleary for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-In this action for the wrongful death 
plaintiff's 3-year::Old son the jury returned a verdict 
favor of olaintifi' and against defendant Franklin GelDel'lIJM~ 
Benevolent Society,l a corporation (hereinafter termed 
hospital), and against plaintitf and in favor of defendants 
Nellie B. Null and Dr. John NulJ.2 Judgment was l!n1:erea 
accordingly, and the hospital appeals. 
It appears that on the morning of July 5, 1946, JI~a ...... ·-
IOn entered defendant hospital for the purpose of having . 
tonsils lind adenoids removed by the Drs. Null. During 
operation the anesthetic, which was gas and ether, was 
ministered by a nurse-anesthetist. The patient started to 
out of the anesthetic on two or three occasions and the 
INaDled in plaiDtiB'. eomplaint (second amended) &I "FlraDlWl!'JI 
Bospitul." 
1.AJao .uamecl .. & clefendant.. but.lI.ot. aerved. was a llulrse~aae.D4~ 
.... ~ ....... ,-~...,;. 
'\ ) 
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thetist administered more ether. After the third incre8l>e in 
ether Dr. John Null noticed that the blood in the paticI;t'li 
throat was dark, which indicated that something was wrong, 
and he also·then found that breathing had ceased. He there-
upon began to apply manual artificial respiration, while tho f . 
anesthetist left the room to secure a mechanical resuscitator. 
She returned with a resuscitator three or four minutes later 
but neither it nor other means used was successful in preserv-
ing or restoring life to the child. 
As grounds for reversal, defendant hospitaleontends that: 
1. Plaintiff failed to' prove certain material allegations of 
his complaint; , 
2. The judgment rests on the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, based on the erroneous theory that the anesthetist was an . 
employe of defendant hospital; 
3. The trial court erred to the prejudice of the hospital in 
the giving of certain instructions, particularly in.~truction8 \, 
proposed by the defendant rloctors relative to the doctrine of l 
res ipsa loquitur. 
[1] The evidenct'. whit· .. must be viewed on appeal in a 
light most favorable to rl'lo;poudent (Estate of Bristol (1943), 
-,,---~3 .cal.2d 221, 223 114:l P.2d 689])J may be summarized as 
follows: ' , 
The child was taken to defendant hospital .at the suggestion 
of defendant Dr. Nellie B. Null, who had previously examined 
him. The child's mother paid a fee to the hospital for use of 
the operating room and for the anesthetic. 
The patient's tonsils were moderately enlarged and in-
flamed but were nc>t in an acute condition; the operation was 
nllt an unusual case or an emergency nor did it involve major 
liurgery. When the child was brought into the operating room 
h" bad already been placed in an "intermediate" or "pre-
~ilQinary anesthetic state"; after he was placed on the operat-
IIlg table further ether was administered, 1irst through a mask 
l,y drops, and latE'r "by tUbe, by pa, causing the ether to 
bubble thrc>ugh tubes." . 
Dr. John Null, who is the son of Dr. Nellie B. Null, testmed 
t!lat "bubbling ether through that tube while the ehild con ... 
hllues unconscious . . . is • CODStant process, constantly \' 
"'atclled, and varies in degree of how fast the bubbling occurs' 
.. '. l:Al ~eat amount of discretion [is] necessary in the 
IIdmlnlstratIon of that ether through the tube ... Unles. . tht-
proper amount is given the child would not at.&7 in the proper \ 
\ 
\ 
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stage of anesthesia, and if it bubbles too slowly he will probably j' 
awake and be turning, and if it is given too fast, if he breathes ' 
it too fast it is apt to stop his heart ... [T]here is a grave 
danger which may well occur if the ether is sent too rapidly in 
the form of bnbbles through that tube"; the witness further 
stated that ether "is a relatively safe anesthetic, and ... is 
one . . . entrusted to the less experienced, in fact, that is :., 
what you train them on in giving anesthetics, is a tonsillectomy._..: 
It is considered safe, but any anesthetic is dangerous .•• '; 
[T]he danger may reflect itself ... By the abolishing of the' 
eye reflexes, which the anesthE'sia blocks; by the changes in the 
rate of respiration, and changes in the pnlse rate and color 
. . . [W]hile an anesthetic is being administered ... through 
the tube ... the anesthetist I mllst] . . . Watch the color, the 
patient's pulse, respiration and reflexes. especially the eye 
reflexes ... it is her duty " rTlhe rrflexes should [not] ° '. 
return at all during the cOUr!~f' of surgf'ry to a person who is 
supposedly in the proper state of anf'~thcsia ... Severa) 
times during . . . the operation [here involved 1 the child 
would partially regain consciousness so that the reflexes in the 
throat, the gag reflex would rE'turn, and she fthe anesthetist~ . 
would have to increasE' the depth of the anesthE'sia before0:J' , 
operation could be continued": the witness attributed "th, at " 
return of the reflex action to . . . too little ether being ae!- ,. 
ministered" and "two or three times to he or his mother asked 1 
the ~esthhetissht to affdminlister more ethIer, Whhicflh she fdid "By 'j";', 
openmg t e uto va ve so as to ,et t e ow 0 oxygen ° 
increase"; the witness further stated that it was "unusual for 
this child to awaken to the extent . . . described . . . oc-
casionally it happens, but it is not supposed to . . . This child 1 
had no unusual tolerance for ether" and the witness did not 
know of "any reason to expect those reflexes to return during 
the course of the operation." 
While the child was "in the depths of anesthE'sia" Dr. Nelhe 
Null started to remove the tonsils and Dr. John Null assisted 
by swabbing and nsing "the suction . . . a mechanical de-
vice ... to pull the blood, mucous and phlegm out of the 
throat"; just after the second tonsil W8..<; removed and after 
the third increase in anesthesia he noticed th(' "blood was 
extremely dark ... [which) means there has not been a 
proper oxygen supply, and either the child was too sound 
asleep and not sleeping [sic] enough. . and I called to the' 
anf'~thetist about it .. fThe 1 anesthetist usually watches i 
the blood, the flow and color ... [which] shows whether the i 
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child is breathing properly or not, and not asleep" and the 
witness assumed "she was doing this." At the same time he 
., also looked up at the child and I didn't see any respiration, 
which also told me there was something wrong . . . [The 
anesthetist] apparently hadn't noticed it ... {It is myl 
opinion the anesthetist gave too much ether to the child . . . 
MOl'e than indicated by the circumstances ... [and] that 
was the cause of the darkening of the blood ... {W]hen that 
kind of danger takes plnN' ... the anesthetist usually im-
mediately stops the flow of ether and artificial respiration is 
immediately instituted .. This time I turned the suction 
over to my mother and fbegan giving artificial] respiration 
•.. with my hands, but the best way is by a mechanical 
!'esllscitator, which applies carbon dioxide and oxygen into 
the lungs ... the very best procedure is to apply the ... 
resuscitator . . . at once .. I W 1 hill.' I was giving manual 
respiration I called for the resuscitator." The machine was 
not in the room and the anest heti~t left the room and returned 
with it three or four minutes later; meanwhile artificial 
respiration was continued. Dr .• John Null testified that he 
did not think that at that time "the child was actually alive, 
in the sense of awake. There was no way of telling wh~tber 
it was beyond help of recalling the life or not, but it is possibie 
that if we had had the mechanical resuscitator there we could 
have gotten the carbon dioxide and oxygen in there and it 
would have started breathing, but to all outward appearances 
it was dead. Lots of times that will happen and they are 
given artificial respiration and the child will come back to 
life." The resllscitator was used but failed to revive the 
ehild, and both doctors were of the opinion the child had died 
by the time the machine was bronght into the room, and that 
the death resulted from an overdosage of ether by the anes-
thetist; Dr. John Null also testified that in his opinion a 
competent anesthetist would not "make a mistake of that 
kind," and Dr. Nellie Null stated that she had performed 
"hundreds of these tonsillectomil,'s" since she had first been 
licensed to practice in 1906 and this was .. the first case in 
which a death has ever occurred in one of" them. The 
doctors further testified that "it is up t.o the anesthetist to put 
the child to sleep, that is her job" and it was her duty if 
she sees the patient "moving around, to get him under so we 
can proceed." 
The doctors stated also that the mechanical resuscitator 
) 
) 
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was "standard equipment for hospital surgery rooms" whieh':J 
"we expect ... to be present in any kind of an operation," , 
and it "should be immediately available, .•. it is not alwaYl:, 
present right in the room, but should be there or close by."', 
A doctor would normally "expect to find it in the room, 
although it is not always there." The hospital stipulated 
that "it is standard practice in the hospitals in San Francisco ' 
to have a resuscitator available for use in the operating 
rooms." 
A coroner's autopsy report indicated that the child's death. 
was caused by "inspiration of hemorrhagic material." The 
doctors testified that it was necessary to cease using the suc. 
tion device in order to apply artificial respiration and that 
artificial respiration would have forced such material into 
the lungs. 
Concerning the employment of the anesthetist the doctors 
testified that the hospital, rather than the doctor, provides the 
nurses, the anesthetist, the operating room, table, and instru. 
ments and "everything for the operation" and that the doc· 
tors did not select nor pay the fee of the anesthetist who 
worked in this case. Dr. John Null also stated that he did 
not employ the anesthetist and was not present •• at any con- ' 
versation in which" his mother employed her. Mrs. Steveii:-~ 
Bon, an employe of defendant hospital,testified that she is1: a "nurse-anesthetist" who was "in charge of all anesthetists" , at defendant hospital at the time of the operation here in·' 
volved; among the anesthetists "employed by the hospital" " 
was the one who worked in this case; since October, 1946, i 
a licensed physician who "specializes in the administra- \ 
tion of anesthetics" had been in charge of the anesthetists; 
"throughout the past several years ... more and more hos- ; 
pitals have placed licensed physicians in charge of . . . their \ 
r anesthetic] department"; the nurse-anesthetist who worked 
in this case •• was in the employ of the hospital just as any 
other anesthetist was," her salary was paid "directly by" 
defendant hospital, she received no "fees or salaries from 
surgeons using the facilities of the hospital" but was "paid 
by the hospital alone," and she left the employ of the hospital 
in April, 1947. 
Mrs. Stevenson testified further that she eouldn't state 
"accurately" how many of the defendant hospital's seven 
operating rooms were in use at the time of the operation here 
involved. bllt it W8o;; hpr "best recollection" that all the rooms 
were then in use "because some of those rooms are runnm, 
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under local anesthetics where we are not involved"; that the 
hospital had only one mechanical resuscitator and she did not 
know where it was on the day here involved. 
Dr. Cardwell, the physician in charge of anesthetists at 
defendant hospital since October, 1946, testified that he had 
bE'en trained and had practiced his profession in Washington, 
D. C., prior to World War II; in 1945 while he was stationed 
in northern California during service with the United States 
Navy, he visited three hospitals in San Francisco and had 
observed therein only one resuscitator "in connection with one 
operating suite or one surgery suite"; the surgery suite at 
defendant hospital consists of eight operating rooms; in the 
other three San Francisco hospitals he had visited five rooms 
was the minimum he had observed to constitute a surgery 
suite; he did not know the number of hospitals in San Fran-
cisco: so far as he knew only two hospitals in San Francisco 
have resuf\citating devices, but "they could have them in 
hospitals where" he had "not even visited"; "the idea of 
having a resuscitator present in or near a surgery room is 
so that if some emergency arises causing the respiration of 
a patient to disappear it can be used at once": "no matter 
how far science -may have advanced, the anesthetist must 
alwaYR be alert and vigilant during tbe operative procedure 
. . . The greatest . . . skill will serve the anesthetist naught 
if Rhe relaxes her vigilance at any time . . .; it is a difficult 
and dangerous field, in which vigilance must be added to 
scientific training." 
1. Asserted Failure of Proof 
Tn the complaint it is alleged (paragraph VIII) "That .•• 
defendants ... so carelessly, negligently and recklessly per-
formed the said tonsillectomy operation as to . . . cause the 
. - . child . . . to suffer . . . a severe hemorrhage therefrom, 
and did carelessly, negligently and recklessly allC7W hemor-
rhagic material to fio'v unchecked into the lungs of the ..• ! 
child. [Paragraph IX.] That as a direct and proximate re-
snlt of the carelessness, negligence and reckles.c;ness of the de-' 
fenrlants . . . said . . . child was caused to ... suffocate 
ann rlrown in itR own blood ... " -
Defendant hospital urges that although plaintiff alleged 
"that thE' child Rllffocated in blood ... Plaintiff didn't TE'ally 
prove anything but. if it ('lIn be said that anything was proved. 
it waR that thp chilo mn" haw rlif'rl from too much anes-
thetic," and that therefore, under the provisions of section 
1 
\ 
1 
, 
, 
\ 
\ 
\ 
1 
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" 471 of the Code of Civil Procedure' plainti1f failed to prove 
his cause of action. 
[a] It is apparent, however, from the evidence related "" 
hereinabove that the jury could properly, and must be pre.; 
sumed to, have concluded from the 'autopsy report that the 
immediate cause of death was the "inspiration of hemorrhagie 
material," that such inspiration resulted from the necessit, .• 
to give artificial respiration and to cease using the suctiOD. '; 
device, and that that necessity waseaused. in turn by the " 
erratic and excessive administration of anesthetic. Defendant'a 
contention of failure of proof in this respect is, therefore, 
without merit. 
2. The Doctrine of Respondeat SuperWr 
[3] Defendant hospital contends that as a matter of law 
the nurse-anesthetist was the employe or agent of the defend-
ant doctors, rather than of the hospital, and that the hospital 
cannot be held responsible for any negligence of such anesthe-
tist. Again, it is apparent that the evidence amply supports 
the implied finding that the anesthetist wa~ the hospital 'a 
employe in the operation here involved. The cases relied 
upon by the hospital (see Ybarra v. 8pa1lgard (1944),25 Cal. 
~ ~6, 491. {1M .P.2d -687,l~2-A.1r.R:-4258 J;-iD -whieh,-+lffr--.lJ 
)court stated "it appears'· the anesthetist and special ,nurse 
were employes of the hospital owner < and W.are v.' Ctdp (1937~ 
24 Cal.App.2d 22, 27 [74 P.2d 283], in which it was held the ,,' 
evidence failed to support a finding that a special nul'Rt' was ' 
the employe of defendant hospital) ditier faetually from the 
instant case and do not compel a holding here that the anes-
thetist was not a hospital employe (see HaUin4n v. Pnndl, 
(1936), 17 Cal.App.2d 656. 662 [62 P.2d 1075]). ~i 
The hospital's contention that the operating doctors rather 
thali the anesthetist were responsible for the proper adminis-
tration and regulation of the anesthetic relates solely to a 
conftict in the evidence. The implied determination of the 
jury that the mentioned responsibility was at least primarily .-
that of the anesthetist is supported by the testimony of the 
doctors which has been heretofore quoted. 
8. The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur 
If] At the request of the defendant doctors the court gave 
ares ipsa loquitur instruction applicable against the doctors 
8That lection provides: "Where .•• the alle&'ation of the elaiD 
••. to whieh the proof is directed. is unproved. Dot in lome particul .. 
or particulars only, but in its genE-raJ scope and meaning, it Ia Ilot tc 
be deemed a case of variance • • • but a failure of puAf." 
.. -) 
) 
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and the hospital.· As declared in Ybarra v. 8pangard (1944:), 
rupra, 25 Ca1.2d 486, 489, quoting from Prosst"l·, Torts, p. 295, 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three conditions: "(1) 
the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur 
in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused 
by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control 
of the defE-ndant; (3) it must not have been due to any volun-
tary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff." In 
Engelking v. Carlson (1939),13 Cal.2d 216,221-222 {S8 P.2d 
695\, where the peroneal nerve was severed in the course of 
an operation on plaintiff's knee, this court declared, "It is 
truE' that in a restricted class of cases the courts have applied 
the do('trinE' of res Ipsa loquitur in malpractice cases. But it 
has only been invoked where a layman is able to say as a 
matter of common Imo'\\'ledge and observation that the con-
sequences of professional treatment were not such as ordi-
narily would have follow(>d if due care had been exercised. 
" For example, it has been applied where a sponge was left 
in the body of the patient aftE'r closing an operative incision 
[citations] ; where the patient was bnrned by the application 
of hot compresses or heating apparatns r citations 1 ; where the 
patient wa.q burned through the operation of an X-ray ma-
chine {citations J ; and where the patient sustained an infec-
tion through the use of an unsterillzed hypodermic needle 
f citations] . In each one of thesE' situations the rule was ap-
plied because common knowledge and experience teaches that 
the result was ont' which would not have occurred if due care 
had been exercised, . 
"But thE' present case shows an entirely ditterent situation. 
Here what was done lies outside the realm of the layman'. 
experience. Medical evidence is required to show not only 
what occurred but how and why it occurred. That evidence 
"The instruetion reads as follows: "1 instruet· you that this is • 
ease in whieh the doetrine of res ipsa loquitur, that is to say, the thing 
speaks for itself, is .applieable to the Franklin Hospital, Dr. Nellie 
Null and Dr. John Null, and the defendants will not be held blameless 
exeept upon a showing either '(I) of a satisfaetory explanation of 
the aeeident. that is, an affirmative showing of a definite eause for 
the seddent, in which· eause no element of neglige nee on the part of 
the defendant inheres, or (B) of sueh eare in aU possible respects as 
neee88arily to lead to the eonelusion that the aeeident could not 
have happened from want of eare, but must have been due to some 
unpreventable cause, althongh the eJ[Aet eause is nnknown. In the 
latter ease, iuasmueh 8S the process of reasoning is one of exelusiou, 
the eare shown must be slitisflH"tOry in the Rense that it eovers all 
eauses whieh due care on the part of the defendant might have pre· 
.ented! " 
1 
I 
\ 
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establishes beyond qu~stion not only that the peroneal nerve 
may be injured even where due care is used but that thil 
unfortunate result invariably occurs in a limited number opt ,.' 
cases. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is, therefore, entirely , 
inapplicable and no malpractice has been proved." 
And in Moore v. Belt (1949), 34 Cal.2d 525, 530-531 ' 
P .2d 509], after citing some fourteen cases OD the proposition, . 
it was stated that "ID the cases cited where the doctrine W&l 
held applicable evidence that the defendant did not (alne-i 
the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common , 
knowledge from the Dature of the injury that the result would 
not happen without carelessness or negligence. In the present 
case the inference that the injury was not caused by the de· : 
fendant, but from some source theretofore existing in the' \ 
plaintiff's system, was not remote but could be drawn from. 
substantial evidence in the record. On the evidenc,e of the ,', 
plaintiff's medical history the jury was not required to but, 
could reasonably conclude that the prior infection, and not '1 
any negligent act on the part of the defendant, was the pron. ~; 
mate cause of the trouble. The inference based on common ',: 
knowledge is at the root of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.' ': 
Before it could be drawn under the facts of this ease the jury;~ 
I, would ha'Ve to reject the hypothesis that the plaintiff's prio "~, 
'condition was the proximate cause. [Citations.]" , ;' 
Neither party cites, nor has any case been discovered, " , 
which res ipsa loquitur has bt'en held applicable where a 
patit'Dt dies during a minor operation while under the inftu- "' 
ence of an anesthetic. Defendant hospital urges that Ybarra ], 
v. Spangard (1944), supra, 25 Cal.2d 486, is distinguishable ' 
in that there the plaintiff, while uncon~ious during an appen-
dectomy, received a traumatic injury ,to his 8houlde~ , 
healthy part of the body, not the subject of treatment nor'; 
within the area covered by the operation-which a layman_~,' 
could say would not have occurred in the absence of negB-)!, 
gence, whereas here expert medical testimony is necessary to '1:' 
determine whether or not negligence caused the patient'.·' 
death during the course of the operation. ~~ 
Plaintiff argues, however, that expert testimony was relied '~ 
npon by the plaintiff in the Ybarra case, to establish an essen- 1".,',·~,' 
tiallink in the chain of causation, and quotes from this court'. 
summary of the evidence, as follows (p. 488 of 25 Ca1.2d): 
"Plaintiff also consulted Dr. Wilfred Sterling Clark, who ',·1'. 
had X-ray pictures taken which showed an area of diminished 
aensation below the shoulder and atrophy and wasting aw,y 
) 
) 
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of the muscles around the shoulder. In the opinion of Dr. 
Clark, plaintifr's condition was due to trauma or injury by 
pressure or strain, applied between his right shoulder and 
neck. 
"Plaintiff was also examined by Dr. Fernando Garduno, 
who expressed the opinion that plaintiff's injury was a paraly-
sig of traumatic origin, not arising from pathological causes, 
and not systemic, and that the injury resulted in atropby. 
-loss of use and restriction of motion of the right arm and 
shoulder. " 
In the instant case there was no suggestion at the trial 
that plaintiff's son died as the result of a preexisting condi· 
tion, whether pathological or systemic in nature. The expert 
evidence is to the contrary and in this respect is wholly un-
contradicted. It shows that, except for infected tonsils and 
adenoids and a slight temperature due to such infection, the 
(~hild was normal and healthy, and that the tonsillectomy was 
not a major operation nor performed as an emergency. Dr. 
Nellie Null. as heretofore stated, testified that in her forty 
years of practice she had performed "hundreds of these ton-
sillectomies" and that this was "the first case in which a death 
bas ever occurred in one of" them. 
[5] Under the circumstances shown We Ilo!<! tenable plain-
tiff's position that the evidence prima facie estabiiShes,-Ui-the-'-
absence of explanation, that "the child's death was due to 
something which ordinarily does not occur in the absence-of 
negligence, that it was caused by an agency or instrumentality 
within the control of defendants, and that it was not due to 
any [legally material] voluntary action or contribution on 
the part of either plaintiff or the child," and, consequently, 
that the res ipsa loquitur instruction was properly given. 
[6] Since it was properly given as to all defendants, it is not 
made erroneous as to defendant hospital by the fact that the 
jury accepted the explanatory evidence as being sufficiently 
eXCUlpatory in respect to the doctors but not to the hospital. 
A review of other instructions criticized by defendant hos-
pital discloses nei prejudicial error. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., eon· 
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. 
The .doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable unless 
tLc accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in 
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thE' abspncE' of someonf' 's negligence. (See Prosser, Torts, 
p. 295.) Since the det.ermination whether the accident ia. 
of that kind is usually made in the light of eommqn experi. 
ence and since medical knowledge is not within common ex· 
; periellCf', the 'doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is usually beld in. 
i applicable in cases of malpractice. It can be invoked, bow· . 
eVf'r. "where a layman is able to say as a matter of common: 
knowledge .and observation that the consequences of profes- j' 
sional treatment were not such as ordinarily would havefol·' 
lowed if due care had been exercised." (Engelking v. Oarl-
Bon. 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [88 P.2d 695].) , ". 
In Escola v. Ooca Oola Bottling 00.,24 Ca1.2d 453 {lSO 
P.2d 436]. the court recognized that the doctrine may apply 
eVE'n though expert testimony is necessary to establish that 
the accident was of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in 
thE' abRence of someone's negligence. The court noted that 
in Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614 [140 P.2d 369], 
it refused to take judicial notice of the technical practices 
of thE' bottling industry and therefore could n9t determine 
whpther it could reasonably be concluded that Ii defect in a 
bottle was more probably than not the result of negligence. i 
1n the Escola case, however, there was expert testimony as to ~ 
such practices _and ,on the basis of that evidence the court 
beld it could reasonably be concluded that it wa. s more prob... 
able than not that the bottle exploded as the result of negli., 
gence. Thus, while ordinarily the occurrence of an accident :, 
is not in itself evidence of negligence, it may be evidence ' 
thereof wben it can be said in the light of common experience 
that the accident would not ordinarily have occurred in the 
absence of negligence, or when experts in the field are able 
to conclude on the basis of their knowledge and experience 
that there is a balance of probabilities in favor of negligence 
as the cause. 
There is no valid objection to permitting proof of negligence 
in malpractil:e cases by such circumstantial evidence. The law , 
requires that physicians and surgeons shall '" possess and 
exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care 
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their pro-
fession under similar circumstances.'" (Sinz v. Owens, 33 
Cal.2d 749, 753 [205 P.2d 3, 8 A.L.R. 757].) Experts may 
testify that the procedure followed by the defendant feU short 
of that commonly employed. and thus provide direct evidence 
of negligence. Apart from the fact that a ct>rtain procedure 
failed, however, what actually happened is often in doubt. In 
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such situations expE\rts may know ali! laymen would not. that 
it is more probable than not that the accident was the result 
of negligence. If they so testify the jury may properly be 
instructed that if they find on the basis of the expert testi-
mony that ordinarily an accident of tht' kind in question does 
not occur in the absence of negligence, they may infer that 
thE' particular accident was the result of nt'gligence. 
In the present case a child died on the operating table 
during a tonsillE'ctomy. An instruction on the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur would be proper only if it may be said in 
the light of common experience that such deaths do not ordi-
naril~' occur in the absence of negligence or if medical experts 
had testified to that fact. Neither basis for the application 
of the doctrine is present Common experience teaches only 
that ordinarily persons do not die during the ('ourse of minor 
operations. In the rare cases where deaths occur the layman 
is with,9llt knowledge or experience to WE'igh the probabilities 
of and against negligent conduct as the cause of dE'ath. It has 
therefore generally been heJd that the doctrint' does not apply 
when a patient dies under anesthesia during a minor opera-
tion such as a tonsillectomy or tooth t'xtraction. (Mitchell 
v. Atkins, 36 Del. (6 W.W.11arr.) 451 1178 A. 593. 595]; 
Dolan v. O'Rourke, 56 N.D 416 [217 N.W. 61)6, 668); John-
son v. Arndt, 186 Minn. 253, 257 [243 N.W 67]; L01tdofl. v. 
Rcott, 58 Mont. 645, 656 [194 P. 488, 12 A.L.R. 1487]; flee, 
also, Nemer v Green, 316 Mich. 307 125 ~.W.2d 207]; Eggert 
v. Dramb1trg, 197 Wis. 153 [221 N.W. 732] ; anno's., 12 A.L.R. 
1493; 162 A.L.R. 1265, 1282-1284.) 
There was nothing in the expert testimony relied upon iB. 
thE' majority opinion to support a conclus10n that ordinarily 
deaths do not occur in the course of tom,;lIectomies in the 
absence of negligence. Dr. Null testified that she had per-
formed "hundreds of these tonsillectomies" and that this 
was" the first case in which a death had t>ver occurred." Her 
testimony establishes only that such accidents are rare; it 
was silent on the question as to what are the probable causes 
when such deaths do occur. On the other hand, there was 
evidence that all anesthetics· are dangerous; tbat the hazards 
of anesthesia are so well known to the medical profession that 
nli"lny of its members have specialized in that field; and that 
it is always a delicate procedure to produce anesthesia. 
From t.he foregoing expert testimony the jury would be 
warranted in concluding. not that fin IInt>sthetic death was 
more probabl.) than not the rc:mlt vI J.1.\~gligcllce, but that it 
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resulted from unavoidable hazards attendant upon any anes-
thetization. (See Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 656 [194 P. 
488, 12 A.L.R. 1487].) Nevertheless the majority opinion 
holds that it was proper to instruct the jury that as a matter 
of law the occurrence of the accident gave rise to an inference 
of negligence against all the defendants, an inference that 
could be overcome only by affirmative evidence on their part 
explaining the cause of death or showing that it could not 
have occurred from any cause that due care on their part J 
might have prevented. . 
By approving the instruction, the court in effect holds that 
solely because an accident is rare it was more probably than 
not caused by negligence. There is a fatal hiatus in such 
reasoning. The fact that an accident is rare establishes only 
that the possible causes seldom occur. It sheds no light on the 
question of which of the possible causes is the more probable 
when an accident does happen. Since common knowledge 
and experience shed no light on this question when a death 
occurs during the course of a tonsillectomy and since the rec-
ord is devoid of expert testimony bearing ou the subject, the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable. I would there~ 
fore reverse the judgment. 
Edmonds, J'f concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November 
t.7,1950. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing. 
